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PULLING THE PLUG ON HEALTH CARE FRAUD:
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AFTER ROCKWELL AND
ALLISON ENGINE
Matthew S. Brockmeier
I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare costs today in American are among the highest of any
industrialized nation. The United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the primary governmental organization
responsible for health care spending and administration, spent over
$650 billion in fiscal year 2007.1 Notably, that total includes only
government spending, and does not include the cost of private
healthcare, which accounts for a large portion of overall expenditures.
In 2006 health care spending in the United States exceeded $2.0 trillion
for the first time.2 In 2007, health care spending reached $2.2 trillion.3
Health care spending reached 16.2 percent of the gross domestic
product in 2007, up from 16 percent in 2006, according to the study.
Further, health care sTending still is increasing at a faster rate than
annual GDP growth, and national health spending is expected to
continue to grow to account for a larger percent of our Gross Domestic
Product with the impending transition of baby-boomers into the
Medicare program.
5
The costs are just as incredible when viewed at the level of the
individual healthcare consumer. In 2002 Americans spent $5,267 per
capita for prescription drugs, hospital stays and physician visits,
compared with $3,446 per capita for Switzerland, the next highest
B.A. Political Science & Economics (2006), The Ohio State University; J.D.
Candidate (2009), DePaul University College of Law.
1 Charles E. Johnson, United States Department of Health and Human Services:
Message from the Chief Financial Officer, Nov. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/afr/financial/message/cfomessage.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
2 Micah Hartman et a]., National Health Spending in 2007: Slower Drug Spending
Contributes to Lowest Rate of Overall Growth Since 1998, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 246,
247 (Jan./Feb. 2009).
3 Id. at 246.
4 Id. at 246, 259-60.
5 Sean Keehan et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2017: The Baby-Boom
Generation is Coming to Medicare, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS w145, w145 (Feb. 26,
2008).
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spender.6 In comparison, the average total cost among other similarly
developed nations was $2,193. 7 By the year 2006, that total had risen to
$7,025.90 per American. 8 That amount has continued to increase,
reaching about $7,421 per person in 2007.9
Fraud and abuse in the healthcare industry are rampant and
contribute significantly to the exorbitant costs of health care in this
country. Estimates vary widely, but it is indisputable that the cost of
fraud each year is in the billions. One organization estimates that of the
nation's annual health care outlay, at least 3 percent - or $68 billion in
calendar-year 2008 - is lost to outright fraud.' 0 Other estimates
calculated by government and law enforcement agencies place the loss
as high as 10 percent of the annual outlay each year.'1 The costs of
fraud, whatever the amount, are far-reaching; though "the immediate
targets and victims of that fraud are private health payers and
government-funded health plans, all of us ultimately pay for the crime
- through higher health insurance premiums (or fewer benefits) for
employers and individuals, higher taxes, and higher insurance co-
payments for privately and publicly insured patients."'
12
As healthcare costs in the United States continue to skyrocket,
Americans are demanding legislation and enforcement mechanisms to
combat the fraud and abuse that are a leading cause of the exorbitant
costs of healthcare. Among the most effective tools currently at the
government's disposal is the False Claims Act ("FCA"). 13 Since
Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1986, the
government has recovered over $15 billion from fiscal years 1987
through 2005.14 Notably, more than 75% of these recoveries were from
6 Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 903, 904(July/Aug. 2005)
7 Id. at 905.
8 Keehan et al., supra note 5, at w146.
9 Hartman et al., supra note 2, at 246.
10 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, The Problem of Health Care Fraud,
http://www.nhcaa. org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=anti_fraud resourcecentr
&wpscode=TheProblemOflICFraud (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
"1 Id.
12 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
PROGRAM FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 (1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ai98157.pdf.
'3 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
14 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION
(Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf.
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health care entities. 15 Although the use of the FCA in combating health
care fraud is not new, its use has skyrocketed to the extent that by 1998,
over half of all qui tam actions involved the Department of Health and
• 16
Human Services. The Department of Justice reported that in fiscal
year 2007 alone, just under $2 billion was recovered under the federal
False Claims Act- a conservative estimate when one considers that the
Department of Justice data does not include the billions of dollars
returned to the states resulting from civil trials or criminal fines
imposed as a direct consequence of False Claims Act filings and
prosecutions. 17
An important provision of the False Claims Act authorizes what
are known as qui tam actions. Qui tam is an abbreviation for "qui tam
pro domino rege quam pro seipso, " which means "he who as much for
the king as for himself." These actions authorize private citizens to sue
in the name of the government and share in any resulting damages. Qui
tam suits have a long history and existed long before this country was
founded. The provisions first gained popularity in thirteenth-century
England as a supplement to ineffective public law enforcement. 18 At
least as early as 1692, the American colonies allowed citizens to sue on
behalf of the government. 19 Of the $21 billion recovered by the
government between 1986 and 2008 under the Act, over 63 percent, or
$13.7 billion, was recovered in cases filed under the FCA's qui tam
provisions.
As of 2007, there were over 630 qui tam health care cases under
seal with the government agencies that investigate and prosecute
them.2 0 Medicare and Medicaid are implicated in the overwhelming
15 See, Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2 Billion
for Fraud Against the Government in FY 2007: More than $20 Billion Since 1986,
(Nov. 1, 2007) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07 civ_873.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2009).
16 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1998,
available at
http://justice.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/l1998/heatlhcare.pdf.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW: OCT. 1, 1986 - SEPT. 30,
2008, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/fraud-statistics l986-2008.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2009). See Appendix for a more complete summary.
18 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM ACTIONS § 4.08 (2d ed. 2001).
19 CLAIRE J. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
(1st ed. 2004) § 2:5.
20 Cases remain sealed to assist in their investigation and prosecution. Responses of
United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez to Questions for the Record Posed
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majority of these cases, which can and do result in multiple million
dollar settlements or judgments. Recent litigation statistics demonstrate
the potential magnitude of FCA qui tam claims. The largest qui tam
recovery to date occurred in 2006, when the government settled claims
against the hospital operator Tenet Health Care for $900 million.22 The
second largest, a $730 million recovery from HCA- The Healthcare
Company, the largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States,
occurred in 2000.23 Most recently, in a qui tam action against
pharmaceutical giant Merck, arising from charges that it routinely
overbilled the government for some of its most popular drugs, Federal
authorities obtained a $650 million settlement resulting from two
separate qui tam actions. The first was obtained in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the other in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; both involved the
popular cholesterol medications Zocor and Mevacor, the painkiller
Vioxx, and the antacid Pepcid.24 According to the Department of
Justice, this was the third largest health care fraud recovery ever.25 As
the examples above clearly show, qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act have become a powerful tool for exposing and prosecuting
fraud. However, examples of its efficacy notwithstanding, a
considerable degree of confusion regarding the False Claims Act
remains in the courts. Since the most recent amendment of the False
Claims Act was passed more than 20 years ago, the lower courts have
struggled to interpret the law in a cohesive manner.
One particularly incoherent area of the law involves the
interpretation of what is known as the "Public Disclosure Bar." 26 The
Public Disclosure Bar, which has existed in one form or another since
to Former Attorney General Gonzales Following the July 24, 2007, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary Hearing Regarding DOJ Oversight. available at:
http://www.cnss.org/SJC%20QFRs%20-
%20July/.2018%202006%2OHearing%2OResponses-DOJ%20FINAL-0 11807.pdf
21 See generally Carrie Johnson, Merck to Pay $650 Million in Medicaid Settlement,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2008, at D1.
22 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tenet Health Care Corporation to pay U.S.
more than $900 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (June 29, 2006),
available at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06 civ 406.html.
23 TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, ToP 20 CASES FALSE CLAIMS CASES,
http://www.taf.org/top20.htm.
24 Linda A. Johnson, Merck settles third largest health-care fraud case, DAILY
HERALD, Feb. 8, 2008.
25 id.
26 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
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1943, limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear qui tam actions
based on "allegations or transactions" which have previously been
previously disclosed publicly via certain hearings, reports, or
investigations, or in the media, unless the plaintiff is the "original
27
source" of the information. Another area which has engendered a
great deal of confusion involves the so-called "presentment"
requirement contained in the statute and the requisite level of intent
under the Act.28 Under certain provisions of the Act, the government or
a qui tam relator is required to show that the claim was actually
presented to the government or a government official; in others,
though, presentment is not required.
The divergent lower court interpretations of the various
elements of the Public Disclosure Bar and other False Claims Act
provisions have resulted in a confusing and enigmatic body of case law
in an area where consistency and clarity are paramount. Until recently,
the United States Supreme Court seemed unwilling to address this
issue. In 2007, however, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time
the meaning of "original source" for purposes of the False Claims Act's
Public Disclosure Bar29, and more recently addressed the troublesome
FCA provision involving presentment.
30
However, these decisions have intimated a certain reluctance by
the Supreme Court to effectuate the statute's purpose by affording it a
broad interpretation, if not an outright hostility towards the Act. If the
False Claims Act is to remain an effective tool in the fight against fraud
and corruption in the health care arena, steps must be taken, by the
legislature if not the judiciary, to ensure that the law continues to
function in such a way that the viability of qui tam suits is maintained
and the potential of a powerful weapon against fraud is realized.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The Federal Civil False Claims Act (which was originally
known by a number of names, including the Informer's Act, Lincoln's
Law, or the Qui Tam statute) was enacted in 1863 to recruit civilian
assistance in preventing corruption and fraud in the sale of provisions
and supplies by contractors to the Union Army during the Civil War.
27 1d.
21 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) - (a)(3) (2000).
29 Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007).
30 Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2125-29
(2008).
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Anecdotes from the period abound and include tales of war profiteers
defrauding the government by shipping boxes of sawdust in place of
supplies and by selling the same horses to the government more than
once. 31 Another enterprising rogue bought defective rifles from the
government for $17,486 and immediately resold them to a different
quartermaster for $109,912.32
Congress sought to eradicate these unbelievably fraudulent
practices by enlisting citizens to aid the federal government in policing
and prosecuting those who would take advantage of their own
government. The original qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act
were "passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern
civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective means of
preventing frauds on the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them
liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the
strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain."3 3 As originally
enacted, the statute imposed liability for virtually any effort to defraud
the government. The original statute also included qui tam provisions
authorizing private individuals to bring suit on behalf of the
government and to share in any recovery.34
However, the original statute was also highly susceptible of
abuse, as demonstrated by the seminal case, United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess. In that case, a relator brought suit against respondent
electrical contractors for defrauding the government through collusive
bidding on Public Works Administration projects in Pittsburgh during
the Great Depression. 35 The defendants had been indicted prior to the
filing of the action for defrauding the government under the criminal
counterpart of the Act.36 On a plea of nolo contendre, they were fined
$54,000. 37 Petitioner then, according to the government, filed his own
civil qui tam suit based on information obtained from the indictment. 38
The government and the defendants argued that Petitioner should not
have been permitted to bring suit. The Supreme Court, though,
disagreed. The Court reasoned that "neither the language of the statute
nor its history lends support to the contention made by respondents and
31 See Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 3d Sess. 955 (Feb 14, 1863) (Sen. Howard) (providing
examples of wartime fraud).
32 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 236 n.14 (3rd Cir. 1942).
33 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D.Or. 1885).
34 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 698. (1863).
35 Hess, 127 F.2d at 234.
36 The criminal provisions are now codified in 18 U.S.C.§ 287 (1994).
37 United States ex rel. v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1942).
38 Id.
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the government., 39 The Court further stated that, "even if, as the
government suggests, the petitioner has contributed nothing to the
discovery of his crime, he has contributed much to accomplishing one
of the purposes for which the Act was passed." The Court rejected the
policy arguments offered by the government against permitting
"profiteering" as irrelevant, noting that the suit resulted in a substantial
recovery for the government ($150,000 in 1940s dollars), and that the
recovery was obtained at the risk of considerable loss to petitioner,
since the statute explicitly provided that petitioner bear the full cost of
litigation.4 0 The Court concluded that the argument was "directed
solely at what the Government thinks Congress should have done rather
than at what it did," and counseled that such policy concerns should be
directed at Congress, because the Act itself was clear in its
authorization of Petitioner's suit. 41
Public outcry over the resulting decision soon prompted
Congress to reconsider the law, and in 1943, eleven months after the
decision in Hess was handed down, the False Claims Act was amended
to limit the availability of qui tam suits. 4 2 The primary means by which
this was achieved was the insertion of a provision that would come to
be known as the "Public Disclosure Bar." 43 That provision limited
Courts' jurisdiction to hear certain cases, barring qui tam suits that
were "based on evidence or information the Government had when the
action was brought. 44 Congress attempts to deter parasitic qui tam
suits proved to be too effective, though. The result in United States ex
rel. Wisconsin v. Dean exemplifies the effect that the 1943
Amendments on the viability qui tam actions.45 In that case, the State of
Wisconsin brought suit against a doctor for making fraudulent claims to
Medicaid. Though the fraud had been discovered by Wisconsin's own
investigation, it had reported it to the federal government as required by
the terms of its participation in Medicare's reimbursement program.
Despite holding that "the information upon which the instant case is
based was sufficiently in the possession of the United States to enable
the federal government to adequately investigate the case and make a
decision whether to prosecute," the district court interpreted the
39 Id. at 546.
40 Id. at 545-46.
4 1 id.
42 Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, § 1, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (1943) (hereinafter 1943 Act).
43 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2000).
44 1943 Act,, 57 Stat. at 608.
45 United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir.1984).
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legislative history of the False Claims Act as conferring jurisdiction
and denied defendant's motion to dismiss. In reversing, the Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit declined to read an exception into the Public
Disclosure Bar, finding that the legislative history reflected a
compromise between the Senate and the House and indicated that the
bar was intended to be absolute.46 Absent clearly expressed legislative
intention, the court refused to read an exception into the statute that it
believed was not supported by the legislative history based on policy
alone.47
The Dean decision demonstrated the extent to which the 1943
Amendment had weakened the qui tam provisions and how much more
difficult it had become to satisfy its jurisdictional requirements. Qui
tam litigation subsequently became virtually nonexistent.48 The 7th
Circuit's decision in Dean prompted Congress to once again reconsider
the Act, and resulted in the passage of the False Claims Amendment
Act of 1986.49 The revision was intended "to enhance the Government's
ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the
Government... "[i]n order to make the statute a more useful tool against
firaud in modern times." 50 The legislative history in both houses of
Congress reveals a sense that fraud against the Government was
apparently so rampant and difficult to identify that the Government
could use all the help it could get from private citizens with knowledge
of fraud. 51 The amendments were intended to revitalize the False
Claims Act's qui tam provisions and create incentives for private
citizens with evidence of fraud to commit their time and resources to
supplement the Government's efforts. They were also intended to
"correct restrictive judicial interpretations which tended to thwart the
effectiveness of the Act".
52
The primary means by which the government sought to achieve
these goals was the insertion of another provision, this time known as
the "Original Source Exception." 53 The provision had originally been a
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, WHY ARE TAF AND THE TAF EDUCATION FUND
NEEDED?,
http://www.taf.org/whytaf.htm.
41 Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 STAT. 3153 (1986) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 3729).
50 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986).
51 United States ex rel. LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F.Supp. 1351,
1355 (D.Mass.1988).
52 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3-4, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267-69.
13 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
[VOL. 12.2:277
PULLING THE PLUG
part of the Senate's proposed amendment in 1943, but for whatever
reason did not make it into the version that was enacted. Incidentally,
had the proposed provision been law in 1984, when Dean was decided,
the qui tam action would probably have been allowed.
The original source exception preserves jurisdiction for certain
actions that would have previously been barred by the Public
Disclosure Bar.54 It essentially carves out an exception to the Public
Disclosure Bar for actions in which the relator was the first to tell the
government about the alleged fraud. In addition to the modification of
the Public Disclosure Bar and the addition of the Original Source
Exception, the 1986 Amendments also significantly enhanced the
amount a whistleblower stood to recover in the event that a suit was
successful, a maximum of 10% to up to 25%, in an effort to "allow and
encourage assistance form the private citizenry" and "bolster the
Government's fraud enforcement effort.",55 Congress also adopted a
lower burden of proof and allowed qui tam plaintiffs to continue to
56participate in the actions after intervention by the government.
III. THE CURRENT LAW
Under the current False Claims Act, those who knowingly
submit, or cause another person or entity to submit, false claims for
payment of government funds are liable for three times the
government's damages plus civil penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per
false claim. 57 The Act encourages private citizens to seek out and report
fraud by providing a monetary incentive in the form of a portion of the
recovery and in doing so serves as a deterrent to would-be perpetrators
of fraud. Private citizens who file qui tam actions are known
alternatively as "relators," "plaintiffs," or "whistleblowers," but all
three terms merely refer to any interested third party who brings action
on behalf of the government.
In general, the False Claims Act covers fraud involving any
federally funded contract or program, with the exception of tax fraud.
Though the variety of fraudulent schemes that can come within the Act
is limited only by the imaginations of perpetrators, some of the more
common examples include private contractors falsifying test results or
14 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
" S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.
56 United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir.1991).
" 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
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other information regarding the quality or cost of products it sells to the
Government, health care providers billing Medicare and/ or Medicaid
for services that were not provided or that were unnecessary, or grant
recipients charging the Government for costs not related to the grant.58
The two elements of the current statute that are central to this
article are the Original Source Exception to the Public Disclosure Bar
and the "presentment" requirement.
A. Public Disclosure Bar and the Original Source Exception
The Public Disclosure Bar and the Original Source Exception
work in tandem to establish federal court jurisdiction over a qui tam
action. The Public Disclosure Bar provision, altered slightly by the
1986 Amendment, now reads:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the
information. 5
9
The Public Disclosure Bar provision was intended achieve one
of the twin goals of the False Claims Act- rejecting suits which the
government is capable of pursuing itself.60 "Where a public disclosure
has occurred, that authority is already in a position to vindicate
society's interests, and a qui tam action would serve no purpose. Where,
on the other hand, a transaction or an allegation of fraud has not been
publicly disclosed, society benefits by creating a monetary incentive for
a knowledgeable person, called a relator, to identify the problem,
present his information to the government.'
There are four essential elements to be considered in
determining whether the Public Disclosure Bar applies are: 1) whether
58 See TAF supra, note 48.
'9 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
6o See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (noting twin goals of the Act).
61 United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Federal, Inc., 324 F.3d 492 (7th Cir.
2003)
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or not there has been "public disclosure," 2) whether it was from an
appropriate source, 3) whether the action is "based upon" the
disclosure, and, 4) whether the action is based on qualifying
"allegations or transactions." If, and only if, the requirements of the
Public Disclosure Bar are satisfied does a Court move on to the
Original Source Exception. The Exception reads:
For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means
an individual who has direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the allegations are based
and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section
which is based on the information.62
The Exception is used to determine whether, if there has been public
disclosure, the relator is the original source. The fundamental elements
of the provision are: 1) whether there is "direct & independent
knowledge" 2) of the "information on which the allegations are based."
The Original Source Exception is aimed at achieving the other primary
objective of the Act- promoting those actions which the government is
not equipped to bring on its own.63 If a qui tam plaintiff qualifies as an
original source, the action may proceed; if not, it is barred.
Although far from pellucid, at first glance the statute may not
seem exceptionally vague or complex, at least compared to other
legislation. However, as evidenced by the degree to which the lower
courts diverge with respect to the interpretation of some relatively
simple the statutory terms and by the amount of litigation the Act has
generated, the precise meaning of the statute is elusive. Presumably
attracted by the potential for treble damages, litigants across the
country have forced the District and Circuit Courts to interpret virtually
every word of every passage of the Act, without much guidance from
the Supreme Court. The consequence is a body of law that is
inconsistent, contradictory, and confusing, and which fails to maximize
its potential to prevent fraud.
B. Presentment Under the False Claims Act
A second provision of the False Claims Act has assumed
64particular significance as of late- the "presentment" requirement.
62 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
63 Quinn, 14 F.3d at 651.
64 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(a)(3) (2000).
2009]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
There are three provisions under which qui tam plaintiffs generally file.
The first renders liable any person who "knowingly presents, or causes
to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval ' 65.
The second creates liability for any person who "knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a
,,66false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government. The
third establishes liability for any person who "conspires to defraud the
Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid."
67
Though the differences between the three provisions may at
least initially appear to be slight and their structure relatively
uncomplicated, courts have again managed to muddy the waters,
reading words into the statute that aren't there, disregarding obvious
Congressional intent, and basically having their way with the law. For
instance, though the word "present" appears nowhere in 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(2), some court have nonetheless read a presentment
requirement into that section, eliminating an important basis for
liability. 68
IV. SUPREME COURT AVOIDANCE & LOWER COURT
INCONSISTENCY
For the first decade after its passage, the lower courts struggled
with the confusing and vague statutory language of the qui tam
provisions of the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, the
modification of the Public Disclosure Bar, and the statute's
"presentment" requirement. Courts have wrestled with the meanings of
statutory terms like "public disclosure," 69  "allegations and
transactions, 70 "direct and independent,, 71 and "to get a false claim
paid" 72 within the context of the newly amended statute since it was
65 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
66 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000).
67 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2000).
68 United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
69 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1992).
70 See, e.g., Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992) (no public
disclosure occurred where government obtained relator's memorandum during
discovery in qui tam suit).
71 See, e.g., United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.
1990) (quality assurance specialist for the Federal Government could not be an
original source).
72 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000).
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enacted. Unfortunately, due to the volume of case law that has arisen
under the Act, a comprehensive analysis of each of the Circuit splits, or
even just those dealing with the Public Disclosure Bar, is simply
beyond the scope of this article. Courts have been asked to interpret
virtually every word of every provision of the Act at some point.
However, the following sample of cases interpreting various elements
of the Public Disclosure Bar and the "presentment" requirement more
than adequately demonstrate how the conflicting Circuit Court
decisions interpretations have fashioned a confusing and ineffectual
body of law in need of judicial, if not legislative, clarification.
A. Public Disclosure Bar
1. "...based upon public disclosure of allegations or
transactions..."
The False Claims Act's Public Disclosure Bar precludes qui
tam actions "based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information., 73 Courts in several
jurisdictions have considered whether or not claims were "based upon"
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and prior to 2007, had
come to different conclusions. Certain Circuits took a "relator-friendly"
view, while others took a position more favorable to the government.
The majority view was articulated first by the second Circuit, which
held that a qui tam suit was "based upon" a public disclosure whenever
the allegations in the suit and in the disclosure are the same, "regardless
of where the relator obtained his information." 74 The Third, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits also addressed the
same issue and came to their own similar, albeit distinct, conclusions.75
7' 33 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
74 United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992).
7' Accord, United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d
Cir. 1999) (qui tam suit based upon disclosure if the disclosure "sets out" allegations
or all essential elements of qui tam claim), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, (2000);
United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecom., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th
Cir.1997) ("based upon" public disclosure means "supported by" disclosure); United
States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir.1999)
(relevant facts disclosed in media after relator filed administrative complaint and
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The minority view was adopted by the Fourth Circuit (and one panel of
the Seventh Circuit in conflict with another panel, which held that
"based upon" should be given its ordinary meaning of "derived from,"
so that the qui tam allegation must have resulted from the disclosure in
order to bar jurisdiction.76 The disparity and incoherence of the
divergent Circuit interpretations of the same False Claims Act
provision finally prompted the Supreme Court to intervene in 2007
when it granted certiorari to hear a case primarily involving the
meaning of the term "based upon.",77 That case is discussed in more
depth below.
2. "...based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions..."
Similarly, Courts have developed various divergent
interpretations of the term "public" in the context of the Public
Disclosure Bar. The split among the Circuits with respect to the
meaning of "public" in this context has revolved around the statute
required actual public disclosure, a narrow interpretation favoring qui
tam plaintiffs, or whether the information is need merely be accessible
to the public, a broad interpretation favoring defendants. The majority
view, shared by the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, is that
that statute requires actual disclosure. 78 For example, in one case a
relator brought a qui tam suit against a Bank for an allegedly false
claim made upon the former federal Farmers' Home Administration
("FHA").7 9 Relator had guaranteed a loan made to her son by the Bank.
before relator filed qui tam suit; therefore qui tam jurisdiction barred unless relator an
original source); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford, Jr., Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 538 (9th Cir.1998); United States ex rel. Precision
Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552-53 (10th Cir.1992) ("As a matter of
common usage, the phrase 'based upon' is properly understood to mean 'supported
by.' "); Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 19 F.3d 562, 567 (1 1th Cir.1994) (per
curiam) ("based upon" means "supported by"); U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron
Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 683 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
76 United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th
Cir.1994); United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir.1999).
77 Rockwell Int'l Corp v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 549 U.S. __ (2007).
78 United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir.1999); United
States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1518
(10th Cir. 1996); United States ex re. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
651 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
79 See Farmington, 166 F.3d at 863.
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The Bank, however, failed to disclose this to the FHA, and when the
son defaulted, the Bank both filed a claim for the loss with the FHA
and sued the relator to enforce her guaranty. 80 The Bank's failure to
disclose the existence of a guarantor on the loan in its FHA claim was
disclosed during discovery, and relator brought a qui tam FCA action
against the Bank. The Seventh Circuit held that discovery material
which has not been filed with the court and is only theoretically
available upon the public's request is not "publicly disclosed" within
81
meaning of False Claims Act.
On the other hand, the Second and Third Circuits have adopted
a narrow interpretation of the term "public."' 82 For example, in the
Second Circuit, federal investigators, armed with a search warrant,
raided a corporate office to seize data about alleged fraud the company
had committed.83 The investigators informed employees of the ongoing
fraud investigation, and one employee subsequently filed an FCA qui
tam action. The Second Circuit held that because there was no
significant distinction between the corporation's employees and
members of the general public, the disclosure was "public," and the
action was barred.
84
The Circuit Courts have also disagreed about whether certain
public documents are nonetheless not necessarily publicly disclosed for
the purposes of the False Claims Act. Most Circuits have held that
administrative reports received in response to Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") requests constitute public disclosure under the False
Claims Act, so qui tam actions based on such reports are barred by the
Public Disclosure Bar.85 However, the Ninth Circuit held that a
document received in response to a Freedom of Information Act Public
Request, though arguably made public through the administrative
process, did not necessarily constitute public disclosure, and thus the
relator, an animal rights activist, was not prevented by the Public
Disclosure Bar from filing a qui tam action against a researcher
80 Id.
81 id
82 United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir.1992);
United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999)
83 See Doe, 960 F.2d at 320.
84 Id
85 See United States ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 384
F.3d 168, 176 (5th Cir. 2004); U.S. ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Authority, 186
F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999); See also United States ex rel. Bums v. A.D. Roe Co.,
186 F.3d 717, 723-25 (6th Cir. 1999).
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receiving public funding. 86 Certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court, presumably because the Ninth Circuit was the sole jurisdiction
not to find the action barred, but the split remains, nonetheless.
3. "...based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions..."
Again, without the help of the Supreme Court, lower courts
have articulated similarly divergent positions with respect to the
meaning of the statute's use of the phrase "allegations or transactions."
Generally, the Courts that have examined this element of the Public
Disclosure Bar have taken a "relator-friendly approach," but despite
reaching similar conclusions, the Courts have employed very different
reasoning.
The majority view, adopted by the Second, Ninth, and District
of Columbia Circuits, is that the provision should be narrowly
interpreted in favor of the relator. For example, the Second Circuit held
that "the Act bars suits based on publicly disclosed 'allegations or
transactions,' not information., 87 The Court explained its narrow
interpretation of the provision as a matter of simple statutory
interpretation, stating that "the language employed in § 3730(e)(4)(A)
suggests that Congress sought to prohibit qui tam actions only when
either the allegation of fraud or the critical elements of the fraudulent
transaction themselves were in the public domain.",
88
The First Circuit, on the other hand, has taken a less
straightforward approach, completely ignoring the phrase as ambiguous
and instead focusing on the statute as a whole, and the circumstances
the Public Disclosure Bar seeks to avoid. 89 The First Circuit is of the
opinion that Courts should determine whether an action is properly
viewed as parasitic in applying the Public Disclosure Bar, the minority
position among the Circuit Courts.
90
86 United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West, 445 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 725, (U.S. 2006).
87 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
88 Id. at 654.
89 United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 24 F.3d 320, 326 (1st
Cir. 1994).
90 Id.
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4. The Proper Source of the "Information"
Lastly, the proper source of the information has been
problematic among the federal courts in different jurisdictions. The Act
enumerates three categories of sources of public disclosure that can
trigger the Public Disclosure Bar: (i) a "criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing," (ii) "a congressional, administrative, or [GAO]
report, hearing, audit, or investigation," or (iii) the news media. 91
For example, the Third Circuit, in Dunleavy v. County of
Delaware, examined the second category. A relator sued the county of
Delaware, PA for the return of over $16 million in Department of
Housing and Urban Development funds made available to the
County. 92 The court held in the context of the second category of FCA
public disclosures that a report prepared by the county and submitted to
the federal government as a condition of its grant did not constitute an
"administrative report" for the purposes of the Act. 93 The Court
examined that language of the Act and determined that the list of
possible sources was exhaustive, and that because the report did not
originate with the federal government, it was not the type of source
contemplated by the False Claims Act.94 As such, the Court held that
the suit was not barred by the Public Disclosure Bar.95 Two circuits that
have not yet ruled on the question presented, the Tenth and Sixth
Circuits, have indicated support for the Third Circuit's position.
96
On the other hand, the Eighth, Ninth, And Eleventh Circuits
have interpreted §3730(e)(4)(A)'s second category in squarely in
conflict with the Third Circuit's holding in Dunleavy.97 Each of those
Circuits has held that the second category does include "administrative"
sources originating with state and local governments. For example, the
Ninth Circuit has held that a California state auditor's report qualified
as source of public disclosure under False Claims Act, barring a qui
tam suit based on that report alleging that the California Department of
91 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
92 United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 1997).
93 Id. at 746.
94 Id. at 745.
95 Id.
96 See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1518 (10th Cir. 1996); See also United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 186 F.3d
717, 725 (6th Cir. 1999).
97 See Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2003); Battle v. Bd. of Regents,
468 F.3d 755, 762 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v.
Premo, 470 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Rehabilitation and its employees had defrauded federal government by
forcing the state government to purchase unnecessary and duplicative
services. 98 The court explained that "the purpose of requiring public
disclosures to come from these sources is to deter opportunistic relators
from filing qui tam suits based on information already known to the
federal government."
99
To further muddy the waters, individual Courts have been
inconsistent in their overall approach to the Act. Simply because a
Court has adopted a narrow, qui tam plaintiff- friendly interpretation of
one provision does not necessarily mean that it can be expected to
interpret other provisions with a similar ideological bent. For example,
despite the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of the term "public" in
Mistick, above, the same Court broadly construed the term "hearing,"
which appears in the same statutory provision. 100
Not surprisingly, the precise meaning of the statutory language
of the Original Source Exception has similarly perplexed Courts, which
have enjoyed little help from the Supreme Court until very recently. As
mentioned above, the Original Source Provision restores jurisdiction to
a Court that would otherwise have been barred by the Public Disclosure
Bar, if the relator is the "original source" of the information. The Act
defines an "original source" as "an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the government
before filing an action under [the False Claims Act] which is based on
the information."' '° Despite the emergence of numerous splits among
the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court avoided granting certiorari to
resolve any of these issues until 1996. The practical implications of this
refusal were enormous, given the resources, both public and private,
spent on the prosecution of False Claims Act litigation, and the
potential recoveries involved. Three main areas of contention can be
gleaned from the case law with respect to the Exception: 1) when does
a relator's knowledge qualify as "direct and independent," 2) when a
relator's disclosure has been adequate to qualify as an "original
source," and 3) when exactly are allegations are "based" on the correct
information. However, a comprehensive examination of the various
lower Court interpretations of this provision is beyond the scope of this
98 United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
99 Id. at 918.
'00 United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir.1991).
'01 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
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article, as it will suffice to say that the Circuit Courts' Original Source
jurisprudence is no more coherent than that of the Public Disclosure
Bar.
B. The Presentment Debate
At this point, it should come as no surprise that courts have
interpreted other provisions of the False Claims Act to the point where
the most trivial details assume extraordinary significance. One example
is the "presentment" requirement, and nowhere was this more readily
apparent than in the case of U.S. ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co..
Allison involved a government contractor who built ships for the Navy
alleged to have submitted inflated invoices to subcontractors.' °2 The
legal question concerned the meaning of the "presentment" requirement
of the Act.10 3 The Act states that "any person who ... knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented... a false or fraudulent claim for
payment" to a government employee is liable to the U.S. government
for civil penalties.' 0 4 In that case, the District Court construed
§3729(a)(2) to require a showing that a false claim had actually been
presented" to the government. 105
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Act contained no such
presentment requirement. 106 This holding was directly in conflict with
a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
had previously held that any claim brought under the FCA requires
evidence that an actual claim was presented to the government before
liability can attach. 107 The Court in Totten determined that the claims
were not "presented" to a government employee, and accordingly
barred government recovery of funds lost to fraud. 0 8 It was precisely
this Circuit Split that prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
Allison, but as will soon be demonstrated, the Court's questionable
decision may have done more harm than good.
102 United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006).
103 33. U.S.C § 3729 (2000).
104 33 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
115 Allison, 471 F.3d, at 611.
106 Id.
107 United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp, 380 F.3d 488, 502 (D.C. Cir.
2004).108 id.
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V. BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE FCA
The Court decided its first post-1986 amendment False Claims
Act case in 1996 when it granted certiorari to hear a case involving the
meaning of the newly added original source exception as applied to the
Public Disclosure Bar. In Hughes, the relator, a former employee of the
respondent aircraft company, claimed that his former company had
knowingly mischarged a contractor, and through it the United States,
for work on a radar system for the B-52 Bomber. 10 9 The defendant
moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that because it was based on
information that they had already disclosed to the government,
precluding jurisdiction under the pre-1986 statute. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed and held that the 1986 Amendment should apply
retroactively.' 10  The Supreme Court reversed.11' Unfortunately,
however, the Court avoided a substantive ruling on the merits, instead
deciding that there was a presumption against retroactivity absent a
clear statutory expression of Congressional intent.
11 2
Just three years later, the Court took its next public disclosure
bar case, this time involving a question of standing.' 13 In Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources, a relator alleged that the Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources had submitted false claim to the
Environmental Protection Agency. 114 Respondent argued that the
relator lacked standing, and alternatively, that in any event, sovereign
immunity protected it from liability. 115 The Court first decided the
threshold issue of standing, ruling that the FCA conferred standing on
relators. Again, though, the Court dodged interpreting the language of
the statute, deciding the substantive issue of the case on Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity grounds." 6 The court tackled yet
another False Claims Act case three years later, in 2003, but again
avoided interpreting the language of the 1986 Amendments. 117 In
Chandler, the relator brought suit against his former employer, a
109 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
110 United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir.
1995).
... Hughes, 520 U.S. at 951.
112 Id. at 952.
113 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
114 Id. at 770.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 788.
117 Cook County v United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
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hospital, alleging that it had fraudulently obtained federal grants. This
time, the Court merely clarified its initial analysis of the applicability of
the Eleventh Amendment to the Act." 8 Next, in 2005, the court finally
interpreted the language of a provision of the False Claims Act. 119 This
decision, though, addressed the applicability of the statute of limitations
provisions and again did not address any one of the more substantive
issues troubling the lower courts concerning the application of the
Jurisdictional Bar Provision.
Miraculously, in 2007, more than a decade after the 1986
Amendment to the False Claims Act, and just as long after the District
and Circuit Courts began (mis)interpreting and (mis)applying the
statute, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider for the first
time just what is an "original source" in the context of the Public
Disclosure Bar of the False Claims Act. 120 Many hoped the decision to
hear Rockwell might mark a turning point in the Supreme Court's False
Claims Act jurisprudence, and indeed, it may have signaled the court's
willingness to finally address some of the issues that had remained
unresolved in the lower courts since the Act was amended. On the other
hand, the peculiar factual and procedural situation in Rockwell left
observers wondering whether the case would have any real impact on
qui tam litigation in the Circuits. Less than a year later, the Court
revisited the Act when it granted cert. in Allison Engine to examine the
whether various provisions of the Act require that the plaintiff/ relator
establish that the false claims were indeed "presented" to the
government. 121 These two decisions will be examined in turn.
VI. ROCKWELL INT'L CORP. V. UNITED STATES
On March 27, 2007 the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in the case of Rockwell International Corp. v. United States.
122
The Court ostensibly took the case to resolve a Circuit Split regarding
the Original Source Exception, namely whether a relator's allegations
qualified as "direct and independent knowledge" or if they were merely
"'
8 Id. at 129.
119 Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
545 U.S. 409 (2005).
120 Rockwell Int'l Corp v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 549 U.S. _ (2007).
12 Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
122 Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1397.
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predictions. 123 Many would argue, however, that the court's decision
had much greater implications.
James Stone was employed as an engineer by Rockwell
International Corporation, a government contractor. Rockwell had
devised a system for disposing of toxic pond sludge which Stone
predicted was inadequate because of problems in the piping system. 124
Stone was laid off, and filed a qui tam action after Rockwell discovered
that the system was indeed defective. However, it turned out that the
defect Stone predicted had not led to the problem. The Government
intervened in the action and filed an amended complaint which did not
allege that the defect Stone had predicted had caused the problem, but
rather alleged that Rockwell's billing the government when it knew
about the actual defect amounted to a false claim. Following a trial, the
jury found for the relator, Stone. Rockwell appealed, alleging that
Stone was not the original source because he had merely predicted a
defect which turned out to be incorrect. However, on appeal, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the District Court decision, finding that Stone was
indeed the "original source" of the information.' 25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address several
questions, including 1) whether the phrase "information in which the
allegations are based" referred to the information on which the relator's
allegations are based, or the information on which the publicly
disclosed allegations that triggered the Public Disclosure Bar is based,
and 2) which of the relator's allegations are relevant. The Court first
found that the word "information" referred to the underlying allegations
of the relator's action, rather than the publicly disclosed allegations. 26
Next, the Court found that the term "allegations" was not limited to the
allegations of the original complaint, but also included the allegations
of the amended complaint.
Based on their findings, the Court determined that Stone's
knowledge was insufficient. 127 They noted that Stone's prediction
ultimately proved to be incorrect- the defect on which the amended
complaint was based was distinct from the piping system defect he had
predicted. Because the ruling meant that the District Court lacked
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1399.
125 Id. at 1400.
126 Id. at 1407.
127 Id. at 1409.
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jurisdiction to hear the case, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's
ruling in his favor.
128
The general consensus is that Rockwell was far more favorable
to defendants than to plaintiffs, to the relief of corporations and the
defense bar and to the chagrin of relators and the plaintiff bar.
Commentators from the plaintiffs and defense bar have largely agreed
that the ruling will make it more difficult for relators to meet the
jurisdictional requirements of the False Claims Act. 129 Though its
effects have yet to be seen, it is likely that Rockwell will come to be
viewed as a lost opportunity for the Court to maximize the
effectiveness of a powerful anti-fraud statute.
VII. ALLISON ENGINE V. UNITED STATES EX REL.
SANDERS
The Court's most recent foray into the morass of lower court
interpretations of the language of False Claims Act was the resulted in
the (date of decision) in Allison Engine Co..' 30 The court granted cert.
to resolve a Circuit split between the Sixth and D.C. Courts of
Appeals. 13 1 Allison involved government contracts to build Navy
missile destroyer ships. The defendant, Allison, was a subcontractor
who was to build the electrical power plants for the ships. The Navy's
contract with the shipyards specified that every part of each destroyer
be built in accordance with the Navy's baseline drawings and military
standards. These requirements were incorporated into each of
petitioners' subcontracts. In addition, the contracts required that each
delivered Gen-Set be accompanied by a certificate of conformance
(COC) certifying that the unit was manufactured in accordance with the
Navy's requirements.
Relators brought suit alleging that that Allison Engine had
submitted invoices submitted the contractors which fraudulently sought
payment for work that had not been done in accordance with contract
specifications. Specifically, they claimed that the gearboxes installed
by Allison Engine were defective and leaked oil and that Allison
Engine was aware of the defects. At trial the relators did not adduce
evidence that Allison had intended to present any false claims. Holding
128 Id at 1412.
129 See, e.g. "Group Meets to Discuss Impact of Rockwell", 49 No. 15 Gov'T
CONTRACTOR Par. 154 (April 18, 2007).
130 Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2123.
131 Id.
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that the relators had failed to meet the False Claims Act's presentment
requirement, the District Court found in favor of the defendant. 1
32
On appeal, Sixth Circuit held that the District Court had erred in
granting petitioners' motion for judgment as a matter of law with
respect to respondents' §§ 3729(a)(2) and (3) claims. The Court of
Appeals held that such claims do not require proof of an intent to cause
a false claim to be paid by the Government. Rather, it determined that
proof of an intent to cause a false claim to be paid by a private entity
using Government funds was sufficient. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals recognized that its decision conflicted with D.C. Circuit Court
in a case called Totten.' 33 Allison Engine appealed, and the Supreme
Court granted cert to resolve the "presentment" debate- whether false
claims for federal government money made by subcontractors are
actionable under § 3729(a)(2) or § 3729(a)(3) of the FCA if the claims
were not presented to the U.S. government.
In a rare unanimous opinion, written by then newly-appointed
Justice Alito, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision.
While the Court acknowledged that a false claim does not have to be
presented to the government under § 3729(a)(2) or §3729(a)(3), the
Court found that under § 3729(a)(2), a plaintiff "must prove that the
defendant intended that the false record or statement be material to the
Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim."1 34 Similarly,
the Court held that under § 3729(a)(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the conspirators agreed to make use of the false record or statement in
an effort to defraud the government, and that the statement would have
a material effect on the government's decision to pay the false or
fraudulent claim. 135
The Court found particularly significant the words " to get a
false claim paid by the government," holding that the language of §
3729(a)(2) did not support the Sixth Circuit's
position that a relator can establish liability by simply showing that a
false
statement resulted in the use of government money to pay a false or
fraudulent claim. The Court attempted to explain itself by reasoning
that "'(t]o get' denotes purpose, and thus a person must have the
purpose of getting a false claim 'paid or approved by the Government'
132 Id. at 2127.
133 United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (C.A.D.C. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032, 125 S. Ct. 2257, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2005).
134 Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2125 (2008).
135 Id. at 2130.
[VOL. 12.2:277
PULLING THE PLUG
in order to be liable under § 3729(a)(2)."' 36 It justified its reading of an
"intent" requirement by cautioning that without it, the reach of the FCA
would expand beyond its intended role of "combating
fraud against the government." The Court explained that "[r]ecognizing
a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private entities
would threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud
statute. 1 37 Essentially, the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation that §(a)(1) contains a presentment requirement.
However, it held that while §(a)(2) does not similarly require
presentment to the government, it does requires a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant submitted the claim for the purpose of getting the claim
paid by the government. 13
8
The Court, however, did not stop there. Instead, it decided to
address §(a)(3), even though the issue was not before it. The Court
found that under § 3729(a)(3) does not require presentment, but that the
plaintiff must show that the agreed that the false record or statement
would have a "material" effect on the government's decision to pay the
claim. 139 Just what this actually means in application has yet to be seen,
as the court did not squarely address it. Although it would seem that the
Court pulled the so-called "materiality" requirement out of thin air, a
number of lower courts had already read such a requirement into the
Act. Exactly where those courts found such a requirement is less clear,
as the words simply do not appear in the text of the statute.
VIII. ON THE HORIZON
Just as the Hess and Dean decisions signaled to many that
Courts had lost sight of Congress' legislative intent and that the False
Claims Act was in need of revision, the Rockwell and Allison decisions
have led commentators to believe that a legislative correction is again
necessary. Indeed, there are currently proposed bills in the House and
the Senate. 140 According to Senator Grassley, the sponsor of the Bill,
the goal of the legislation is to override these misinterpretations of the
FCA. 141 The law, knows as the False Claims Correction Act, passed the
136 Id. at 2128.
"3' Id. at 2130.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 2130-31.
140 Senate Bill 2041, 1 1 0 th Cong. (2007).
141 Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Durbin, Leahy, Specter Sponsor
Legislation to Fortify Taxpayers Against Fraud, (Sept. 12, 2007), available at
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Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2008. Similar Legislation passed
the House Judiciary Committee in July of 2008.142 Both bills received
overwhelming bipartisan support, but neither were signed into law
before Congress went out of session. However, with the Obama
administration's emphasis on healthcare and their need to locate
revenue to pay for the programs it plans to initiate, it would not be at all
surprising to see the bills reintroduced.
Additionally, even if both the Supreme Court and the Congress
are unwilling or unable to resolve the issues that are preventing the
False Claims Act from realizing its potential, the states seem willing to
address this important topic on their own. There are currently over a
dozen states, as well as the District of Columbia, with their own False
Claims Acts. 143
IX. CONCLUSION
Qui Tam actions under the False Claims Act have resulted in
the recovery of over billions of government dollars since the 1986
Amendment, according to data from the Civil Division of the United
States Department of Justice. 144 In health care fraud cases (matters in
which the Department of Health and Human Services is the primary
client agency) alone, qui tam actions under the False Claims Act have
resulted in the recovery of over $9.1 billion- over 72% of all qui tam
recoveries- through settlements and judgments. Undeniably, the
prospect of sharing in the amount recovery is the incentive that compels
many, if not all, relators to come forward and report cases of fraud and
abuse. If courts continue to limit the availability of this important
statute to qui tam plaintiffs, the incidence of health care fraud against
the government can only be expected to increase. The resulting increase
in the cost of health care and related services will be passed on to a
http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&
ContentRecord-id=fa770cO4-1321-0e36-ba 19-
486c 19da895e&Region id=&Issue id=
142 H.R. 4854, 110 t ' Cong. (2007).
143 States with their own False Claims statutes include California, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia and the District of Columbia. See J. Barger, Jr., P. Bucy, M. Eubanks, and
M. Raspanti, States, Statutes, and Fraud. An Empirical Study of Emerging State False
Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REv. 465, 478 (2005).
144 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fraud Statistics 1986 - 2008, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/fraud-statistics1 986-2008.htm. See
Appendix for a more complete summary.
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public already struggling to pay some of the highest health care prices
in the industrialized world. The Supreme Court should instead
approach the Act with its primary goal of preventing fraud in mind.
However, the Rockwell and Allison decisions may indicate that the
Court is unwilling to interpret the statute in light of its original purpose.
If that is the case, it may be necessary for Congress and the States to
intervene. The False Claims Act is already on life support- it is crucial
that no one pulls the plug on it.
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